We investigate the effects of heterogeneity and incomplete information on aggregate contributions to a public good using the voluntary contribution mechanism in a non-linear laboratory environment, using three-person groups in a partners environment under varying conditions of information and communication. Bergstrom, Blum and Varian predict that increasing heterogeneity will have no effect on aggregate contributions in a no-communication environment. Ledyard conjectures a negative effect of heterogeneity, a positive effect of incomplete information, and a positive interaction of heterogeneity and incomplete information. We find that incomplete information has a small but significant negative effect. Heterogeneity has a positive effect on aggregate contributions, but its effects interact unexpectedly with communication. In a no-communication environment, heterogeneity in two dimensions (income and preferences) increases contributions substantially while heterogeneity in a single dimension (income or preferences) has little effect. In the communication environment we find the reverse. We also find a positive interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information. Thus we reject the Bergstrom, Blume and Varian invariance result and provide mixed evidence on Ledyard's conjectures. E-mail: mullera@mcmaster.ca Full text at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/faculty/mullera/recentpapers.htm -1-
HETEROGENEITY AND THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

I. INTRODUCTION
The City of Hamilton, in Canada, borders on a large harbour which is subject to heavy industrial use but which is now increasingly viewed as a recreational and ecological resource.
Under a Remedial Action Plan, two large firms, many smaller firms, two municipalities, provincial and federal authorities are expected to undertake expenditures for remediation and prevention of pollution in the harbour. All parties have different sizes, different interests, and different abatement cost structures. This leads to payoff structures which are imperfectly known to one another and almost certainly non-linear. Although all agents are viewed as "stakeholders" in the health of the harbour, they face no binding regulation or external economic motivation to undertake these expenditures. Rather they discuss and co-ordinate their plans through membership in a "restoration council" and an "implementation team".
The key aspects of this field environment are that the agents differ in at least two dimensions (size and cost structure), that they are incompletely informed about each others' payoff structures, that they can and do communicate with each other before making voluntary contributions to a public good, and that the problem is non-linear in the sense that the optimal allocation of resources almost certainly lies in the interior of the choice set. The voluntary contribution mechanism for the provision of public goods seems to be an appropriate model of the field environment. This suggests that the theoretical and empirical literature on the voluntary contribution mechanism should give some insight into the problems faced in the field. In equilibrium as long as the MPCR is less than 1. In a non-linear environment, Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) demonstrate that the non-cooperative equilibrium level of aggregate contributions is independent of reallocation of endowments among contributors. This implies that limited heterogeneity should not affect aggregate contributions in no-communication environments.
Once tacit or explicit co-ordination is admitted, theorizing becomes less precise. On the negative side, asymmetries in endowments or payoff structures frequently lead to disproportionate contributions and unequal payoffs at the group optimum, leading to the need for negotiation and side payments to ensure that cooperative equilibrium is a pareto improvement. These difficulties may raise the cost of achieving the group optimum. Bardhan (1993) , Kanbur (1992 ), Hackett (1992 , Ostrom (1992) and Olson (1983) all make arguments consistent with this position. A contrary view is presented in the sociology literature by Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira (1985) , Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl (1988) and Heckathorn (1993) , who argue that in heterogeneous environments there is a greater probability of finding a "critical mass" of individuals willing to contribute to the public good. This may have positive effects in that the motivated individuals will devote resources to persuading or compelling less interested individuals to contribute or negative effects in breaking up previously well entrenched groups. The models used in this literature are highly complex and rely on numerical simulation for their conclusions.
The experimental evidence is very slim. Ledyard (1995, 159-60) surveyed five linear public goods experiments that have directly addressed the heterogeneity issue. Three of these (Marwell and Ames, 1979 ,1980 , Bagnoli and McKee, 1991 , and Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993 studied threshold public goods environments, the first finding no effect of heterogeneity while the other two found some negative effects. Of the remaining two, Fisher, Isaac, Schatzberg, and Walker (1994) provides only tangential evidence. 1 Brookshire, Coursey and Redington (1993) provide a controlled test of the influence of both heterogeneity and information in a linear environment. Working with groups of ten they considered three heterogeneity conditions (a baseline with common preferences for the public good, a "majority 1" condition in which one individual had 50% of the group demand for the good, and a "majority 2" condition in which two individuals shared 60% of the group demand) and two information conditions (complete vs. no information about others' payoffs). They found that the majority 1 condition reduced contributions while the majority 2 condition increased them, relative to the baseline. Incomplete information generally increased contributions. 2 On the basis of this survey, but warning that more research is needed, Ledyard (p. 160) conjectures that heterogeneity will reduce contributions (except, perhaps with incomplete information) while incomplete information will increase them (except, perhaps, with homogenous groups). That is, he expects a negative effect of heterogeneity, a positive effect of incomplete information and a positive interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information.
Other experiments suggest that Ledyard's conjecture may be applicable only to linear public goods environments. The second design of Isaac's and Walker's (1988) study of 5 We chose a three-person environment for consistency with our earlier experiments. Bardhan's (1993) suggestion that small groups are more likely to coordinate successfully implies that using three-person groups allowing communication should increase the likelihood of optimal voluntary contributions regardless of the heterogeneity characteristics of the groups. Any heterogeneity effect will have to be strong if it is to be observed. 6 Instructions are included in Appendix A.
-6-and preferences on aggregate voluntary contributions to a public good in a non-linear environment, under alternative conditions of information and communication. To address it we conduct a laboratory experiment with three-person groups in a partners environment. 5 In general we discover that incomplete information has a small but significant negative impact on aggregate contributions. Heterogeneity has a positive impact on aggregate contributions, but its effects interact unexpectedly with communication. In a no-communication environment, heterogeneity in two dimensions (income and preferences) increases contributions substantially while heterogeneity in a single dimension (income or preferences) has little effect. In the communication environment we find the reverse. We also find a positive interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information. Thus we reject the Bergstrom et al. non-cooperative equilibrium model and provide mixed evidence on Ledyard's conjectures.
II. THE LABORATORY ENVIRONMENT
In our laboratory environment individuals in each group of three repeatedly allocated their laboratory dollar (L$) endowments to Market 1 (a private good market) or to Market 2 (a public good market). All instructions were framed in neutral language. Allocations were restricted to integer values. Subjects were given tables showing their payoffs according to their own allocation and the allocation of the remaining subjects in the group. They reported their decisions and were informed of the results through a network of personal computers.
There were 22 decision rounds in each session, divided into five phases. The first phase consisted of six decision rounds, during which there was no communication among the subjects.
The first two rounds were treated as practice periods and the data from them were discarded.
The remaining four phases consisted of four decision rounds each, preceded by limited face-toface communication (see Table 1 ). At the end of 22 periods, subjects were paid their accumulated payoffs, converted from laboratory dollars to Canadian dollars at a rate common to all participants that was announced at the beginning of the session.
Two information conditions were used. In the incomplete information condition subjects had no information about the incomes and payoff tables of other group members. In the complete information condition they knew both the incomes and payoff tables (preferences) of the other people in their group. In all cases subjects knew their own incomes, payoff tables, the identity of the other individuals in their group and when the session would end.
Each individual i had an endowment of tokens. The payoff to individual , , was
derived from the function where is the allocation to the private good, , is the aggregate allocation to the public
is the individual's allocation to the public good, and is a parameter which g i 'w i &x i " i characterizes individual preferences for the public good.
There were two levels of heterogeneity in endowments: same endowment (SE) with , and different endowment (DE) with , and two levels of w i '20 oei w 1 'w 2 '18, w 3 '24 heterogeneity in preferences: same preferences (SP) with and different preferences (DP)
with . In all treatments, the group income, , was L$60 per period and the " 1 '" 2 '6, " 3 '15 W aggregate preference parameter was 27. The two heterogeneity factors were combined "'' i " i with the information factor in a complete 2x2x2 factorial design replicated 3 times (Table 2 ) .
When communication was permitted, subjects with complete information were told that they were permitted to discuss anything they wished, other than physical threats or side-payments, for four minutes. Subjects were also reminded that they had each others payoff tables, which they could bring to discuss during the communication phases of the session. They were also told that any agreements they reached during their discussion would not be enforced by the session monitor or by the computers. Subjects with incomplete information were only permitted to share qualitative information about their own payoffs. They could state that a contribution pattern increased or decreased their payoff, but could not state the quantitative change. Recall that in these sessions subjects had only their own payoff tables.
IV. PREDICTIONS
In a non-cooperative environment the best response function for individual i is given by This function is bounded below by the constraint that contributions cannot be negative. Assuming the constraint is not binding on any subject, setting n=3 and summing over i we obtain
Aggregate contributions in equilibrium depend only on the aggregate group endowment, W, and the aggregate preference parameter, . Given our experimental parameterization this is 21 " 7 These are homogeneity (SE/SP), two variants of heterogeneity in a single dimension (SE/DP and DE/SP), and one variety of heterogeneity in two dimensions (DE/DP). 8 In ten of the sessions there were two groups of 3 subjects; in the remaining four there was only one group.
-9-tokens in all conditions. The group optimum contribution is easily computed to be 43 tokens.
In a full-information, non-communication environment, the Bergstrom et al. prediction is that the non-cooperative equilibrium will prevail in all four heterogeneity conditions. 7 The effect of communication and incomplete information is not obvious. We have seen that a case can be made for and against a negative effect of heterogeneity. We adopt as a working hypothesis
Ledyard's conjecture that heterogeneity in either or both dimensions will reduce aggregate contributions and that there will be a positive interaction between incomplete information and heterogeneity.
IV. RESULTS
Seventy-two subjects in 24 groups of three participated in a total of 14 sessions. 8 Sessions were completed in less than ninety minutes. The average compensation for participating was $27.75 (the range was $19.00 to $43.50; standard deviation was $5.37). Table 3 reports mean contributions by treatment and phase. Inspection of Table 3 shows 9 SE indicates endowments are the same across all subjects in a group and DE indicates the endowments are different. SP indicates preferences are the same across all subjects in a group and DP indicates preferences are different. See Table 3 . 10 The remaining ANOVAs are reported in Appendix B.
-10-that mean contributions for the two single homogeneity conditions (SE/DP and DE/SP) generally move together relative to the remaining conditions. This impression is strengthened by visual inspection (Figure 2 ). We tested the equivalence of the SE/DP and DE/SP conditions by conducting an analysis of variance of mean contributions with respect to the four heterogeneity conditions (SE/SP, SE/DP, DE/SP and DE/DP), information, communication and all their
interactions. An F-test on the underlying regression retained the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all terms involving SE/DP were equal to the corresponding coefficients involving DE/SP (p=0.573) .
9 This led us to pool the single heterogeneity conditions, leading to a threeway categorization of homogeneity, one-dimensional or "single" heterogeneity (in endowments or preferences) and two-dimensional or "double" heterogeneity (in endowments and preferences). Table 4 summarizes the mean group contribution by these new categories of treatment.
The pooled data constitute a 3x2x2 factorial design in heterogeneity, communication and Table 5 . 10 In addition, we conducted non-parametric randomization tests (Moir, 1998) on selected hypotheses. These tests, coupled with inspection of Figure 1 and Table 4 lead to the following observations.
11 See ANOVA tables in Appendix B.
-11- (Table 5 and randomization tests).
There is a significant interaction between communication and heterogeneity (p=0.002).
However Table 4 shows that mean contributions with communication exceed mean contributions without communication under each of the three heterogeneity categories.
This effect is significant for the homogeneity and single heterogeneity categories (F-test, p= 0.019 and p= 0.000 respectively) but not for the double heterogeneity category (p = 0.348). -13-information and hetereogeneity is very weakly significant (p = 0.106). Inspection of Table   4 shows that mean contributions in homogeneous environments with incomplete information (21.92) are much less than mean contributions in homogeneous environments with complete information (29.80). A randomization test shows this difference is significant ( p = 0.071) as does analysis of variance (p = 0.065). Mean contributions in heterogeneous environments do not differ much across information conditions (means of 30.00 and 30.07 for one-dimensional heterogeneity and 29.04 and 28.00 for twodimensional heterogeneity). Neither difference is significant on a randomization test (p = 0.506 and p = 0.399 respectively) nor on F-tests.
12 Consequently, while we reject the null of no effect of information in favour of the alternative of some effect, the strength of the result is based on the impact of incomplete information in homogeneous environments. €
We note that Observation 3 rejects the Ledyard conjecture that incomplete information will increase voluntary contributions generally. However the finding of a negative impact of incomplete information in the homogeneous environment is consistent with his conjecture of a positive interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information. This finding is strengthened by the next observation.
Observation 4: Heterogeneity increases coordination when information is incomplete.
There is a weakly significant interaction between heterogeneity and incomplete information (p = 0.106 study of a non-linear common pool resource environment. Table 6 compares some of our results to the latter two papers. Besides their differences with respect to linearity and formulation of the dilemma (common property versus public goods) the laboratory designs differed in several respects. We used groups of three subjects while Isaac and Walker (IW) used groups of four and
Hackett et al. (HSW) used groups of eight. Communication in the IW and HSW sessions was allowed before each decision period while we allowed subjects the opportunity to communicate before each block of four decision periods. Nevertheless, it is possible that the key differences in finding are driven by the distinction between linear and non-linear environments.
Why should heterogeneity lead to higher aggregate contributions? The sociological literature, cited above, argues that heterogeneity may generate environments with a critical mass of contributors who may devote resources to convincing others to contribute. Since there are no opportunities for persuasion in our no-communication environment, some other factor may be at work. The positive interaction with incomplete information may provide a clue. In a heterogeneous environments the high preference or endowment individual has an individual incentive to contribute more than the other members of the group. When information is incomplete, the other group members might interpret this higher contribution as indicating a desire to co-operate and they might increase their contributions accordingly.
Our findings suggest several directions for future research. First, questions remain about the pattern of giving by the individuals with lower incomes and the individuals who did not value the public good as intensely as others. The evolution of patterns of coordination and allocation have yet to be studied. Second, it would be useful to examine whether our results are robust to changes in the size of group. Third, and perhaps most pressing, is the need is investigate whether the non-linearity of our environment resloves the apparent discrepancy between the results of our study and Hackett's et al. on the one hand and the Isaac and Walker study on the other. 1 The analysis of variance was conducted with 48 observations. The mean squared error is 5.26. The R-squared is 0.715 and the adjusted R-squared is 0.657. The interaction terms C*II and H*C*II were dropped from the analysis of variance which used the complete set of interactions. The p-values for these two interactions were 0.434 and 0.794 respectively. 
Introduction
The session is divided into periods. At the beginning of each period, you are given some tokens. There are two markets to which you may allot your tokens. Your token payoff is determined by how much you allot to Market 1, and how much you and others allot to Market 2. You need only decide how many tokens to allot to Market 2. Any remaining tokens will allotted to Market 1.
A payoff table has been provided for you to help you decide how much to allot to Market 2. The table describes your payoff in tokens based on your allotment decision to Market 2 and the decisions of others in your group. The numbers on this payoff table include your returns from both your Market 1 and Market 2 allotments. Consider the payoff table on the sheet titled EXAMPLE. These numbers are in no way meaningful to the session but are only introduced to help you understand how to read a payoff table.
Your possible allotment decisions are listed across the top of the table. The combined possible allotment decisions of the other members of your group are listed in the left-most column. In order to read this table, you must find your allotment decision in the top row, and move down the column until you reach the combined allotment decision of others in your group.
Consider the case where you allot 3 tokens to Market 2 and the others in the group have a combined allotment to Market 2 of 5 tokens. Find the number 3 in first row. While in this column, read down the column until you reach the row which has 5 in the left-most column. Here you should find the number 10. This is your payoff in tokens for this combination of allotments. Please complete the questions on the EXAMPLE sheet. Raise your hand when you have answered the questions and a monitor will review your work and answer any questions you may have about reading the payoff table.
The Market
At this point, please direct all further communication to the session monitor. Information about your decisions is to stay private. Any questions you have will be answered if you raise your hand.
You will be linked, via computer, to two (2) other individuals in this room. The three of you form a group which will remain together for the session. At the beginning of each period, you will be given some tokens. The computer will prompt you for your allotment decision for Market 2. The session will have two parts. Prior to the start of the second part of the session a new set of instructions will be read aloud. The rules guiding your decision for your allotment to Market 2 during part 2 will be specified at that time. At no time are you permitted to allot either more tokens than your endowment or less than zero. Any remaining tokens will be allotted to Market 1. See SAMPLE SCREEN. At the beginning of a period, you will receive a message on your screen concerning your allotment to market 2 for that period. Type a number in the square [ ] brackets and press ENTER when you are sure you are done. Use the BACKSPACE key to make corrections.
When everyone in the room has made an allotment to Market 2 your payoff for the period will be calculated and reported to you. You will also see the combined allotment to Market 2 of all other individuals in your group. Using the information on the screen, you can verify the computer's payoff calculation by using your payoff table. At the end of this period, enter your information on the Record Sheet. The Group Total on the Record Sheet should be the sum of your allotment to Market 2 plus the allotment of Others to Market 2. The next period will begin, and the procedure continues as before.
Information Condition
The total token endowment for your group is 60 tokens. Your token endowment is entered on your Record Sheet. Notice that the maximum allotment decision you can make to Market 2 is the token endowment entered on your Record Sheet (in this case you invest no tokens in Market 1). Notice that the maximum combined allotment decisions of the other members in your group is the difference between 60 tokens and your token endowment. The other members of your group may have payoff tables which are different from yours. The other members of your group may have token endowments which are different from yours. Information about payoffs and token endowments is private information.
Payoffs
The conversion rate for tokens is 1 token = $0.0023 Canadian throughout the session. For instance, if your payoff in a particular period is 326 tokens, then your Canadian dollar earnings are 75 cents for that period. Again, the value 326 is completely arbitrary, and only used for the purpose of example.
There are two parts to this session, the first part lasts six (6) periods. Before the next part, new instructions will be distributed and read.
Information Condition
The total token endowment for your group is 60 tokens. Your token endowment is entered on your Record Sheet. The payoff tables are being distributed now. Each of you will receive three payoff tables, corresponding to the three members of your group. The endowment of each member of your group appears as the right-most number in the first row of each payoff table. This number will be either 18, 20, or 24. Notice that the maximum allotment decision you can make for Market 2 is 18 tokens if you have an 18 token endowment, 20 tokens if you have a 20 token endowment, or 24 tokens if you have a 24 token endowment (in each of these cases you invest no tokens in Market 1). Notice that the maximum combined allotment decisions of the other members of your group is the difference between 60 tokens and your token endowment. Please switch your payoff tables with another person in the room. Notice that the tables you received are exactly the same as the tables you gave up. Your payoff table has a letter in the top right corner which corresponds to the letter on your folder.
Payoffs
The conversion rate for tokens is 1 token = $0.0023 Canadian throughout the experiment. For instance, if your payoff in a particular period is 326 tokens, then your Canadian dollar earnings are 75 cents for that period. Again, the value 326 is completely arbitrary, and only used for the purpose of example.
Instructions for Part 2 (Incomplete Information Condition)
Sometimes, in previous sessions, participants have found it useful, when the opportunity arose, to communicate with one another. We are going to allow you this opportunity before some of the remaining periods.
You will have the opportunity to participate in sixteen (16) more periods in which you make token allotments to Markets 1 and 2. The environment will be identical to that of the previous six periods except you will have an opportunity to communicate with the members of your group. Before periods seven (7), eleven (11), fifteen (15), and nineteen (19) you will have an opportunity to meet with the members of your group. There will be some restrictions on your communication.
1)
You may not discuss any quantitative aspects of the private information you may have on your payoff tables. Information on endowments may be shared but information on specific payoffs under various conditions may not be shared; the direction in which payoffs may move are qualitative aspects of your payoffs and may be shared (for example, you may indicate that a particular pattern of allotments may increase or decrease your payoff, but you may not indicate that your payoff will change by (say) 373 tokens).
2) You may not discuss or make side payments or physical threats.
3) Agreements made during the communication phases of the session will not be enforced by the monitors or the computers.
4)
Meeting time will be limited to four (4) minutes, but you may return to your computer stations earlier.
Instructions for Part 2 (Full Information Condition)
1)
You may not discuss or make side payments or physical threats.
2) Agreements made during the communication phases of the session will not be enforced by the monitors or the computers.
3) Meeting time will be limited to four (4) minutes, but you may return to your computer stations earlier.
Because of these restrictions on communication with one another, one of us will monitor your discussions. To facilitate this, communication will take place away from your computer stations, but in this room.
Remember, after you have returned to your computer stations and the next period has begun, there will be no more communication until four decision-periods have been completed.
4.
Example Payoff Sheet 
ANOVA -Complete Model
. anova AvgG hetero comm info hetero*comm hetero*info comm*info hetero*comm*info Number of obs = 48 R-squared = 0.7464 Root MSE = 5.47877 Adj R-squared = 0.6275 Dummy Variables: de different environment dp different preferences ph1 phase 1 (not 4) ph1de ph1*de ph1dp ph1*dp ph1dedp ph1*dp*de ii incomplete information iide ii*de iidp ii*dp iidedp ii*de*dp iiph1 ii*ph1 iiph1de ii*ph1*de iiph1dp ii*ph1*dp iiph1dep ii*ph1*dedp . regress AvgG de dp dedp ph1 ph1de ph1dp ph1dedp ii iide iidp iidedp iiph1 > iiph1de iiph1dp iiph1dep 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------<intermediate tests deleted>
. test iiph1de=iiph1dp,acc ( 1) de -dp = 0.0 ( 2) ph1de -ph1dp = 0.0 ( 3) iide -iidp = 0.0 ( 4) iiph1de -iiph1dp = 0.0 -----------+--------------------------------------------------- 
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------
---------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
F -----------+----------------------------------------------------
-----------+----------------------------------------------------
F -----------+----------------------------------------------------
-----------+----------------------------------------------------
Total | 410.182292 11 37.2892992
